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Abstract 
Review of the 2011 book Thinking, fast and slow by Daniel Kahneman published by New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux (ISBN: 9780374533557; 499pp.) 
 
The better a person understands his/her own 
determinism (his/her own objectness), the closer 
he/she comes to understanding and realization of 
his/her own genuine freedom. (Bakhtin, 2002, vol. 6, p. 
398 (translation from Russian is mine). 
Daniel Kahneman, an Israeli cognitivist psychologist and a Nobel Prize winner in Economics in 
2002, delivers bad news for the humanity. Our human individual mind makes very poor judgments. But 
even more, not only we are cognitively deficient and are unaware of these deficiencies but we rarely change 
our judgments even when we have learned about these deficiencies. According to Kahneman, who worked 
closely with another famous American cognitive psychologist Amos Tversky, our individual mind consists 
of two systems. System#1 involves a mostly invisible intuitive inductive uncritical mind based on pattern 
recognition, association making, making consistent coherent stories, simplifying and so on. System#2 
involves mostly familiar deductive, logical, deliberate, reason- and argument-based, critical, calculative, 
rational mind. Through various clever lab and natural experiments and personal stories. Kahneman 
convincingly demonstrates how often the quick System#1 makes judgments and decisions instead of the 
slow System#2. But even when System#2 is activated, more often than not, it uncritically swallows the data, 
provided by System#1. In itself, it may not have been necessary bad, if only System#1 had been accurate 
and smart – the problem is that it is not the case, according to the intensive empirical evidence provided by 
the author. People’s mind is much less self-conscious about its own work, less rational, and more 
susceptive to fallacies and manipulation. In this book review, I, as a dialogic educator and researcher, want 
to share my excitement and appreciation as well as critique of this wonderful new book. 
Let me share a few of my favorite examples from the book. The most striking evidence for me of 
how System#1 tacitly guides our behavior is a case of so-called “priming.” The psychologist John Bargh 
and his collaborators asked undergraduate 18-22-old students at New York University to assemble 
sentences from a set of 5 given words. In the experimental group of the students, the word sets included 
words associated with elderly such as “Florida,” “forgetful,” “bald,” “gray,” or “wrinkle.” The control group did 
not have words associated with elderly. After this task, the research participants were asked to go down 
ISSN: 2325-3290 (online)  






Dialogic Pedagogy: An International Online Journal | http://dpj.pitt.edu 
DOI: 10.5195/dpj.2017.178  |  Vol. 5 (2017) 
 
R2 
the hall to continue the experiments. However, the true focus of the researchers was on measuring the time 
for the participants to get across the hall. The young participants from the experimental group walked 
significantly slower through the hall than the participants from the control group. Kahneman explains that 
first, System#1 tacitly triggered thoughts and associations about old ages, which then primed a behavior, 
walking slowly, which is associated with old age. Both stages of the priming occur without any awareness 
of the participants. Interestingly, as the cognitive researchers showed, the effect can be reversed if the 
participants developed negative attitude to elderly – they would walk faster than the control group. The tacit 
System#1 can be easily manipulated exactly because its work is not under control of the actor. 
My other favorite case about the faulty System#1 involves the author’s experiments about fictitious 
lady named Linda, 
Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she 
was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in antinuclear 
demonstrations (p. 156). 
Graduate students were presented with the question, what is more probable: Linda is a bank teller 
or Linda is a bank teller who actively participates in the feminist movement. Ninety percent of the research 
participants chose the latter answer, despite the “obvious” fact that active feminist bank tellers are a subset 
of the total bank tellers pool. A subset of a pool automatically reduces the probability, regardless of a 
description of a particular case. Kahneman argues that in this case, the fast institutive System#1 tacitly 
replaces the presented question about probability with a question about representativeness: based on 
Linda’s description, she better matches to an active feminist, who happens to be a bank teller, than to a 
generic bank teller. As Kahneman convincingly demonstrates, System#1 is notoriously bad about 
probabilistic judgments. In contrast to visual illusions, awareness of the cognitive fallacies caused by 
System#1, does not necessarily help to correct them. 
So, what should we do to address cognitive fallacies caused by the fast intuitive tacit System#1 
that often lets us jump to wrong conclusions? As Kahneman points out, mere awareness of these fallacies 
is not very helpful. The author proposes using special formal procedures and/or replacing human judgments 
with objective formulae. For example, Kahneman recommends employers, who seek to hire new 
employees, to develop no more than 6 independent factors that define the success of the job, operationalize 
each of these factors with 2-3 interview questions, and rate each job candidate on the questions using 5-
point scale, trying to make sure that rating on one question does not influence rating on another question. 
Than a simple formula should be developed adding all the rates that will allow to rank the candidates. The 
employer must stick to the result of the ranking, resisting any temptations to use his or her holistic judgment 
because the latter will be shaped by the cognitive and perceptual fallacies by System#1. The author goes 
even so far to suggest that a simple formula of the frequency of sexual intercourse minus the frequency of 
marital disputes can predict more accurately the marriage stability or divorce rather than any clinical 
judgment by a marital expert.  He believes that the increasing proliferation of the objective formulae based 
on research evidence (i.e., “evidence-based practice”) will improve the practices by eliminating the 
subjective human judgment based on cognitive fallacies of System#1 and, thus, will make a victory of 
System#2 (rational objective calculation) over System#1 (pattern recognition) possible. 
To the author’s credit, he provides self-criticism to his cognitivist research and argumentation. He 
admits that his research focuses on documentation of cognitive fallacies rather than to study successes of 
the System#1, which might have skewed his conclusions. Also, the author admits that he has been 
predominately interested in human judgments involving so-called “low-validity practices.” Low-validity 
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practices involve a high degree of probability and/or lack of any regularity rule. Kahneman’s research 
collaboration with Gary Klein, another reknown cognitivist psychologist and a scholarly opponent of 
Kahneman, helps to explore limitations of Kahneman’s research, argumentation, and conclusions. Klein 
has found System#1 to be much more powerful, successful, and useful. In contrast to Kahneman, Klein 
has studied human intuitive expert judgments in high-validity practices with immediate feedback and high 
deterministic regularities like firefighting or chess playing. Kahneman agrees that in these “high-validity 
practices,” human intuitive expert judgment, based on pattern recognition, grounded in the participant’s 
extensive experience, can be very accurate and valuable. However, as chess playing shows, smart 
computers (and smart programs) can outsmart human pattern recognition and thus human intuitive expert 
judgment. 
Throughout his book, Daniel Kahneman discusses hostile reception of his research, argumentation, 
and conclusions. He points out that in a part, this hostility comes from our System#2, who has difficulty to 
come to terms that it is not always or even not much in the driving seat of the mind. Many critics accuse 
Kahneman of being mechanical, rigid, non-contextual, and so on. In my authorial judgment (sic!), this 
critique is both unfair and fair. I judge it unfair because I agree with cognitivist psychologist Kahneman that 
our mind can function like a smart machine, based on a pattern recognition, and also it has limitations and 
fallacies, worth of studying. Recent exciting advances in smart machines based on pattern-recognition, 
complexity, and self-organization – such as chess playing, voice recognition, writing recognition, self-driving 
cars, and so on – have left no doubts that smart machines can outperform human intuitive and rational 
expert judgment. Furthermore, I agree with the author that formulae and smart machines should replace 
human intuitive expert judgment whenever it is possible. My argument in agreement with Kahneman is 
based not only on effectiveness, accuracy, fallacy-free, and efficiency, as Kahneman convincingly argues, 
but also on a moral argument that this labor and work (cf. Arendt, 1958) may not necessary be human 
endeavor in the first place. 
This brings me to my critique of Kahneman. I argue that his mechanistic vision of human mind is 
based on mechanistic practices (both low and high validity practices that he considered), in which this 
human mind operates. Aristotle named these mechanistic practices as “poiesis.” In poiesis, the goal, the 
definition of success, and the definition of the quality of the activity pre-exists and is predefined explicitly or 
implicitly before the activity takes place. In contrast to poiesis, there is “praxis”, defined by Aristotle as 
practice, in which the goal, the definition of success, the definition of problem, and the definition of the 
quality (i.e., values) emerge and are negotiated in the practice itself. I argue that many cognitivist 
psychologists like Kahneman, Tversky, and Klein have studied mind in poietic practices. It is no surprise 
that in many (if not all!) Kahneman’s examples and experiments, the goal, success, and quality of the 
activities were predefined or could be predefined in advance. If this is the case, I believe that in poiesis-like 
practices, human mind can be viewed as an imperfect smart machine, can be modeled by a smart machine, 
can be improved by a better formula and smart machine, and, thus, can be legitimately replaced by a smart 
machine as more accurate, reliable, effective, and efficient, regardless of how upsetting it may sound for 
us, humans. 
While highly appreciating Kahneman’s innovative approaches to study human mind and important 
consequential findings, I argue that the human nature cannot be reduced to predictable outcomes of 
behavior, judgment, and action. Boesch argued that “a main trait of human reality is to transcend itself” 
(1993, p. 15). This suggests that the human nature reveals itself not when human behavior, action, and 
judgment are governed by System#1 (pattern recognition) or System#2 (rational objective calculations), so 
nicely studied and described by Kahneman, but when humans transcend these systems, using these 
systems as the building material for this transcendence. Thus, patternless outliers, rather than statistically 
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significant patterns, should be studied to reveal this transcending essence of the human nature (Gladwell, 
2008). The outliers often creatively redefine the situation, the purpose of the activity, the normative relations 
in which they find themselves, transforming the poiesis of the psychological experiments into praxis. The 
issue of desirability becomes for us of how we can promote an authorial judgment, which is responsible – 
i.e., answerable to other people and the actor him/herself, – rather than how we can subordinate the 
System#1 (pattern recognition) to System#2 (rational objective calculation). The authorial responsible 
judgment does not annihilate nor does it put aside System#1 and System#2 – pattern recognition and 
rational calculations – but, it rather uses them as the material for their transcendence. This is especially 
important in education. Let’s consider the following example. 
Matusov (2015) describes a case, in which an educator, named in his article as Mr. Jim, faced an 
important educational dilemma. Mr. Jim worked in an afterschool program with Latino/a children at a local 
Latin-American Center in the US in the early 2000s. He organized an activity, in which 7-14 years old 
children had an opportunity to create their “digital stories.” Mr. Jim got two expensive digital cameras from 
a local state university that the children, who wanted to participate in the activity, could borrow for a day or 
two to shoot a video of their choice. Then, they edited their raw footage and added narration and music 
through Mr. Jim’s guidance and peer mutual help. Mr. Jim designed an online prototype of YouTube (it was 
before video sharing was available on the Internet), the Center’s children, staff, and parents could rate the 
children’s videos and make comments on them. Since, there were more children who wanted to participate 
in the activity than the cameras, Mr. Jim developed a waiting list. Pedro, a 12-year old Mexican boy, signed 
for the activity. Pedro had very negative reputation at the Center. He was known to the Center children and 
staff as a thief. He was caught twice by the police for shoplifting and was suspected in stealing a cellular 
phone from the Center. He had countless suspensions and detentions from his school and he had problems 
with his behavior at the Center. Many children at the Center did not like him because of his stealing and 
involvement in fights. When his turn came to borrow an expensive digital camera, not only the Center staff 
but also many children objected because they were sure that Pedro would simply steal the $1000-worth 
camera. Pedro also expected that he would not get the camera and started his objection arguments in a 
whining and increasingly aggressive tone. To surprise of all, Mr. Jim offered a camera to Pedro. Pedro 
could not believe in what happened and tried to make sense of it. He asked Mr. Jim if he had many cameras. 
Mr. Jim said that he had only two. Pedro asked how expensive the cameras were. Mr. Jim replied that each 
costed $1000. Pedro asked what would happen if a camera disappeared. Mr. Jim replied that the Center 
would become a less exciting place, the university would probably stop giving money to support the Center’s 
exciting activities. Then Pedro directly asked Mr. Jim of why he was trusting the expensive digital camera 
to him. Mr. Jim replied because he was next and because he wanted to make a digital story. Pedro took 
the camera. Next day, he was suspended from the Center for a fight for a few days. However, he asked his 
father, who had three jobs, to come to the Center after his third job to return the camera on time. Pedro’s 
digital story about his drug infested neighborhood was the winner – it had the highest rating on the video-
sharing site designed by Mr. Jim. 
In argument with Mr. Jim, Mr. David, another instructor at the Center, provided a very good rational 
evidence-based argument guided by System#1 and System#2 of why Pedro should not be trusted with an 
expensive digital camera. The risk was high. Mr. Jim did not have much rational, objective, evidence-based 
counter-argument to offer. It was not a case that Mr. Jim had known something about Pedro that Mr. David 
or the rest of the community had not known. It was not a case that Mr. Jim calculated Pedro better than the 
rest (Bakhtin, 1999), foreseeing that his trusting defenseless offer of the expensive camera would transform 
Pedro’s vile nature through this random act of kindness. No. Although Mr. Jim was very glad that Pedro 
returned the expensive camera back and won the digital story competition with his brilliant socially-charged 
video, it was not his goal either. What was it? 






Dialogic Pedagogy: An International Online Journal | http://dpj.pitt.edu 
DOI: 10.5195/dpj.2017.178  |  Vol. 5 (2017) 
 
R5 
At the time, during the events, Mr. Jim did not know what was the goal of his trusting offer to Pedro. 
It took several years for him to fully realize and articulate it. Mr. Jim realized that he wanted to disrupt the 
toxic careless environment and predictable dysfunctional social relations in which Pedro had been trapped 
back then, in order to create a space for Pedro’s authorial responsible action (and judgment). This authorial 
responsible action might or might not involve returning camera. For example, Pedro might have decided to 
sell it in order to buy medicine and toys for his sick younger brother, unilaterally prioritizing the acute needs 
of his family over educational and entertaining needs of the Center. This arguably could also have been an 
authorial responsible action but its responsibility unilaterally prioritizing family over the Community Center, 
would have been contested. The dialogue, initiated by Pedro, between Pedro and Mr. Jim about the 
meaning of his action was very important for creating this space for authorial responsible action because 
with a high probability this dialogue continued for Pedro internally and externally perhaps in his family. 
Citing famous German poet of the XIX century Goethe, Viktor Frankl argued, 
If we take man as he is, we make him worse, but if we take man as he should be, we make him capable of 
becoming what he can be … So if you don’t recognize a young man’s will to meaning, man’s search for meaning, 
you make him worse: you make him dull, you make him frustrated. While if you presuppose in this man, there 
must be a spark for meaning. Let’s presuppose it and then you will elicit it from him, you will make him capable 
of becoming what he in principle is capable of becoming (Frankl, 1972,). 
Again, the issue is not to calculate Pedro into a desirable action or an attitude, but rather to create 
an opportunity for a human-to-human encounter be able to occur (Bakhtin, 1999; Buber, 2000), 
The encounter/meeting is the ultimate opportunity to hear yourself in the other. This other can be a physical 
interlocutor or it can be an encounter with a text or with some phenomenon of culture, which forces me to make 
that very effort. The encounter/meeting, which I am talking about, is that what presupposes my great effort to 
encounter the other who is not overlapping with me (i.e., opaque to me), but who is interesting for me. [This 
meeting generates] a point of puzzlement/surprise and at the same time it is a point of some kind of unusual joy 
of discovery of myself in the [other] unexpected for me. This is as if [the other] talks about something that is deeply 
intuitively clear to me. And at the same time, [the other] creates the space, in which these deep intuitions of mine 
begin to live and begin the fireworks of my own creative thinking … [The other] capture[s]/hook[s] something in 
me, which is essential about me. To “capture/ hook” something in me, means to provoke, spark, self-actualize, 
and initiate some kind of my own activity. And this situation of the encounter/meeting that I am describing here is, 
as a matter of fact, an educational situation. The genuine education unavoidably involves an element of 
provocation.  
What is important for me, as a teacher, is that my encounter with the students is the space of my own 
personal self-growth, my own self-actualization. The encounter with my students is the process of my own self-
making/self-creation/self-becoming and, thus, my own self-education (originally in Lobok, 2014; cited in Matusov 
& Marjanovic-Shane, 2015, p. 216). 
In case of Mr. Jim and Pedro, this encounter occurred, making both of them outliers of the given 
past relations. However, this encounter is not and never can be guaranteed. Arguably, the purpose of 
education (among some others) is to create possibilities for such human-to-human encounters. An educator 
cannot design an encounter but only favorable conditions for it. 
Kahneman can be wrong because he equates the human mind-in-poiesis, i.e., “taking man as he 
is” (cf. Frankl’s quote above), with the human per se. Human mind in praxis-like practices, where goals, 
problems, values, successes, qualities emerge, are defined by and negotiated with the immediate and 
remote participants, may not be studied and approached in the same way Kahneman has studied and 
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approached mind-in-poiesis because an observed phenomenon does not exist independently of the 
observer, who is just another participant in defining and negotiation of the goals, values, problems, and so 
on (this is just one of many reasons, see other reasons here: Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2016, in press-
a). For example, judgement of a pedagogical success is always contested and is in the eye of the beholder. 
Thus, Sigmund Ongstad (2007) presented an interesting, but sad, story illustrating how mainstream school 
does not appreciate and care about students engaging in Big Dialogue about ideas and testing limits of 
knowledge, if not actively discourages them, 
The following task was given as one in a set at the official national exam in ‘Norwegian’ for all upper secondary 
schools (high schools) in 1973 in Norway, ‘The number of youngsters who marry already in their teen ages has 
increased heavily the last years. There are especially many girls who marry that early. What can be the causes 
for this development, and what is your view upon that so many marry so young?’ Later the same year a class at 
a local school got the same task. However, one of the students contested the very premise for the task and wrote, 
as his assignment, a harsh critique of the whole task, arguing why the premise is invalid. The local lecturer gave 
him a bad mark (for not having answered the given task). The student then contacted the Central Statistical Office, 
who could confirm that he was actually right. The premise was not valid. He then approached the teacher and the 
Norwegian department of Education again, without result. He even challenged the school’s headmaster, who was 
a MTE teacher as well, in the hope that this ‘sensible man’ would support his claim. However, neither the 
headmaster nor the Norwegian department of Education would admit any mistake. The task had even been given 
at the national exam the same year and had not caused problems. And one crucial argument was: You are 
bristling up against the task instead of trying to come to grips with the problem (Retold in English based on an 
article in Aftenposten (newspaper), Oslo October 1973 by Sigmund Onstad). 
This reminds us of a confrontation between Soviet psychologist Luria and illiterate adult Uzbeks, 
who rejected the premises of Luria’s syllogisms in his famous experiments in Central Asia in the early 1930s 
(Luria, 1976; Matusov & St. Julien, 2004; Scribner, 1977). Authorial judgements by outliers can be judged 
by other outliers, whose judgment will have to be also authorial, thus, contested and not objective because 
the purpose, the definition of quality, and the criteria for judgment emerge in the judgment itself and do not 
pre-exist it as it is in school tests and Kahneman’s and Luria’s psychological experiments. 
Another, but related, limitation of Kahneman’s research ontology is his interest in isolated, self-
contained, monologic mind. Again, this interest may be legitimate in poiesis-like practices divorced from 
other aspects of human life. However, in praxis-like activities, where new meanings, new goals, new quality, 
new judgment criterions emerge, mind should be viewed as connected, transactional, and dialogic. In 
praxis-like activities, meaning emerges not as a pattern or rational calculation but as a serious answer to a 
genuine, information-seeking question asked primary by the other and secondary by the self (Matusov & 
Marjanovic-Shane, 2016, in press-b). Thus, it is important to point out the limitations of the cognitive studies 
of human mind that can never be reduced to System#1 or System#2. We need a new science of human 
mind as authorial dialogic outliers, moving away from poiesis-like objective voiceless methodologies (cf. 
Bakhtin, 1986, who made a similar call). 
Psychology of judgment is viewed by Kahneman either as a deviation from the classical rationalism 
or as an illegitimate shortcut to the classical rationalism. These psychological deviations and shortcuts have 
their own regularities that cognitivist psychologists, like Kahneman, study by using a big number of subjects. 
Classical rationalists view people as perfect, or, at least, desired machines. Cognitivist psychologists view 
humans as imperfect machines, although not without their own heuristic advantages in “high-validity” 
practices. In both cases, humans are given and calculable (at least in a statistical sense of the big number). 
My criticism here is not that the classical rationalism and cognitive psychologism are wrong but rather that 
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their truth is limited and they do not know and do not seek to know their own limits. I agree with classical 
rationalists and cognitive psychologists, like Kahneman, Tversky, and Klein, that humans are and can be 
both perfect and imperfect machines in their thinking and acting. This makes their studies of humans as 
imperfect predictable calculable machines very useful and consequential. However, I disagree with 
Kahneman’s approach to mind reducing humans to perfect or imperfect predictable calculable machines 
and defining the human nature as such. I see the most important usefulness of studying humans as 
(im)perfect machines in helping us stop acting like rational or irrational machines when we wish so and, 
thus, to claim our non-machine-like, unpredictable, incalculable, dialogic humanity. I think it is extremely 
useful to consider humans as being both (im)perfect machines and as authorial dialogic agencies. In this 
sense, my view of humans is unapologetically dualistic. 
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